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Noncomputability, unpredictability,
undecidability & unsovability in economic &
finance theories
Ying-Fang Kao, V. Ragupathy, K. Vela Velupillai & Stefano Zambelli⇤
⇤Professor Daniel S. Grac¸a kindly sent us the ‘internet’ version of his paper, Noncom-
putability, Unpredictability, and Financial Markets, just published in Complexity. In a foot-
note to the Internet version he handsomely acknowledges that his assertion in the published
version of this interesting paper that ‘no noncomputable problem with economical or financial
inspiration has been presented before’ is ‘incorrect’. He, then, generously mentions the work of
our group on Computable Economics (although the inclusion of J.Holm in this list is slightly
anomalous) as evidence towards a correction of his ‘assertion’. This note is simply a minor
note of clarification, amplifying the ‘assertion’ and providing more specific examples - directly
relevant to the content of Professor Garc¸a’s stimulating contribution. Quite apart from the
particular inspiration of the general issue discussed in Professor Garc¸a‘s paper, and in ours’,
we have benefited greatly from his interesting work on computability in dynamical systems
(cf. for example, Collins & Garc`I§a, 2008 and Ragupathy & Velupillai, 2012)
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Abstract
We outline, briefly, the role that issues of the nexus between noncomputabil-
ity and unpredictability, on the one hand, and between undecidability and un-
solvability, on the other, have played in Computable Economics. The math-
ematical underpinnings of Computable Economics are provided by (classical)
recursion theory, varieties of computable and constructive analysis and aspects
of combinatorial optimization. The inspiration for this outline was provided by
Professor Garc¸a’s thought-provoking recent article in this Journal.
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1 Noncomputability, Unpredictability, Undecid-
ability and Unsolvability in Economics & Fi-
nance
Professor Garc¸a, in his thought-provoking article in this Journal, has raised the
important question of the nexus between noncomputability and unpredictability
in economics and finance theoretical frameworks. This nexus, together with
that between undecidability and unsolvability, has been at the core of classical
behavioural economics ([12]), arithmetical and orthodox game theory, choice
theory, learning and dynamics in micro and macro economics and in many
other core areas of economics and finance theory, for almost exactly half-a-
century. These are issues that have been at the core of research in what we have
come to call Computable Economics1 from its very inception, serendipitously, at
the hands of one of the foremost pioneers of computability theory, Alan Turing
([25]2). Turing’s classic formalisation of ‘solvable and unsolvable problems’ – his
last published paper – was one of the crucial starting points3 for the emergence
of classical behavioural economics, almost single-handedly forged by Herbert
Simon4, within the framework of Human Problem Solving ([15]), underpinned
by boundedly rational agents seeking satisfactory solutions to economic decision
problems5. Indeed, the doyen of mathematical economics, Kenneth Arrow, em-
phasised the nexus identified by Professor Grac¸a – between noncomputability
and unpredictability – at about the half way point between Turing’s classic of
1954 and CE in a characteristically prescient conjecture ([2]6, p. S398; italics
added):
“The next step in [economic] analysis, I would conjecture, is a more
1Computable Economics as a new name, characterising the formalisation of economic and
finance theoretic entities using the formalism of recursion theory and constructive analysis,
was coined by Velupillai in 1983. At that time he used it interchangeably with Turing’s
Economics, but settled on Computable Economics in 1987.
2Reprinted, together with one of Kleene’s classics, as the lead article in [31]. We shall refer
to this collection as CE in the sequel.
3The others being Polya’s approach to problem solving, as first formulated in the elegant
How to Solve It? ([17]) and Peirce’s fertile concept of retroduction (as distinct from the tire-
some dichotomy between induction and deduction), going back to Bolzano’s idea of abduction,
which itself can be traced - as all such things can - to Aristotle.
4Herbert Simon is the only person to win both the Nobel (Memorial) Prize in economics
(1977) and the Turing Prize (1975), awarded by the ACM.
5Decision problems in the strict sense of metamathematics and, hence, leading to the
modern framework of computational complexity theory, to the empirical development of which
Herbert Simon contributed significantly. It must be remembered that Simon was not only a
Professor of Economics, but also of Computer Science and (Cognitive) Psychology.
6In more senses than one this was the year that Computable Economics ‘came of age’,
with the comprehensive research program set out by Alain Lewis ([13]). For reasons that we
have been unable to comprehend, this fertile research program was inexplicably abandoned
a few years later by Alain Lewis. It may be useful to add that Velupillai was unaware
of the research program Lewis had formulated at the time he coined the name Computable
Economics. Moreover, Velupillai was informed by Paul Samuelson, during a personal telephone
conversation in January 1987, that Kenneth Arrow had been a student of Emil Post and that
Alain Lewis considered himself a pupil of Kenneth Arrow.
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consistent assumption of computability in the formulation of eco-
nomic hypotheses. This is likely to have its own di culties because,
of course, not everything is computable, and there will be in this
sense an inherently unpredictable element in rational behavior.”
The complete analytical framework for this particular nexus, within Com-
putable Economics, was elegantly summarised by [10].
As for the modelling of economic dynamics, both at the macro and micro
economic level, using one or another variety of computable analysis, in particular
invoking what he called the Pour El - Richards theorem ([18]), but with explicit
references to both [1] and [14], Velupillai, in his Arne Ryde Lectures of 19947,
made the relevance of recursively inseparable sets in generating uncomputable
solutions in perfectly orthodox settings of economic problems – but pointing out
the need for refining the definition of the relevant domain to be sets of natural
(or rational or, for reasons of analytical necessity, algebraic numbers).
Finally, there is the relevance of Hilbert’s Tenth Problem and the Halting
Problem for Turing Machines in typical economic settings. The former was
comprehensively surveyed in [26]; (chapter 19 of CE), with an especial place
for the pioneering work of [19]; (see CE, chapter 14), for the whole tradition of
undecidability and unsolvability in arithmetical games properly assigned. The
latter – i.e., the Halting Problem for Turing Machines – was elegantly invoked in
a computable macroeconomic model of growth, framed as a Busy Beaver Game,
by [33]; (chapter 28 of CE)8.
In the case of computable finance theory, the current classic is, of course, the
comprehensive textbook by [22], but one of the undisputed pioneers of finance
theory and its empirical analysis, Maury Osborne [16], was fully aware of the
nexus between noncomputability and undecidability emerging from perfectly
ordinary and orthodox financial data9. Within our own work, as Computable
Economists, Shu-Heng Chen’s doctoral dissertation [8], written under Velupil-
lai’s supervision, at the Center for Computable Economics at UCLA (now de-
funct), explored actual data generated in the functioning of the Taiwanese stock
market using the framework of Kolmogorov (or algorithmic) complexity to inves-
tigate uncomputability and its implications for the e cient market hypothesis.
Quite apart from any variety of computable analysis10, there is the fer-
tile area of constructive analysis where the noncomputability-unpredictability
nexus emerges via a consideration of choice sequences in intuitionistic math-
ematics [24], an area of research in Computable Economics that is only now
7Published much later as [28], due to an unforgivable error by Oxford University Press, to
whom the manuscript was submitted in 1998! Meanwhile, the results appeared in [27].
8Contrary to what is asserted by Garc¸a as an explanatory comment in stating his ‘Propo-
sition 6’ (ibid, p. 4), Zambelli was able to use the Busy Beaver Function to generate noncom-
putable numbers in exact analogy with [20], thereby avoiding the use of any nonconstructive
diagonal argument.
9The ‘stock market charts’ to which Professor Garc¸a correctly refers.
10Professor Garc¸a’s article works within the particular framework of Computable Analysis
elegantly developed by [32], itself based on what we have, in other writings, referred to as
the ‘Polish Tradition’ of recursive analysis [3]. [1], for example, is in what we refer to as the
Russian – or Markov – tradition of Computable Analysis.
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being developed. However, the place of constructive analysis in Bishop’s sense
[4], and its relevance for core areas of microeconomic choice theory, was elegantly
and almost comprehensively analysed by Bishop’s co-author, Douglas Bridges
at a very early stage of the evolving research program of computable economics
([6, 7]; Chapters 8 & 9, in CE). An insight into a noncomputable result and
a constructive proof, the fertile interaction between classical recursion theory
and basic Bishop-style constructive analysis, is provided by the demonstration
that the foundational result of Computable General Equilibrium Theory, the
Uzawa Equivalence Theorem, implies the decidability of the Halting Problem
for Turing Machines ([29]; chapter 24 of CE) and the Lesser Limited Principle
of Omniscience (LLPO; [23]; chapter 25 of CE).
2 Brief Clarifying Notes on the Economics of
Grac¸a’s Analysis
Professor Grac¸a, in our opinion, raises important methodological issues on the
role of mathematical formalism in economics and finance theories. To make his
serious methodological points concrete he tries to frame the issue of the nexus
between noncomputability and unpredictability in terms of a simple economic
problem: that of discounting a stream of returns using a standard formula. Lest
the unwary economics reader of his important methodological paper loses sight
of the rich thicket that are the woods, for the fragile trees, we would like to
clarify some of the possible misunderstanding due to infelicities in the economic
arguments.
Right at the outset it must be pointed out, as clearly indicated in the rich vein
of results reported in the previous section, Professor Garc¸a’s important method-
ological insights on the nexus between noncomputability and unpredictability
in economics and finance, in no way depends on the particular economic and
financial examples in which he clothes his discussion.
The main infelicities, however, are the following: the reference to a ‘fair
value’ in the discounted cash flow model (DCFM); the connection of this model
with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), is less than tenuous; the key
formal, analytic, assumption that e : N ! R and u : N ! R are never made
in economics – indeed, neither are the members of the range of any such map-
ping, in economic contexts, are restricted to any kind of computable reals and,
hence, almost all discussions of approximating any kind of equilibrium value
in economics or finance theories are meaningless; the example of the German
hyperinflation of 1923 as showing the di culty of prediction, referring to a chart
in Bresciani-Turroni’s classic ([5], p. 39), is slightly misplaced.
If we take just the last example, Garc¸a – who is not an economist and, there-
fore, should not be ‘taken to task’ for any of the economic or finance theoretic
infelicities – misses the important point, which any reasonable macroeconomist
would have inferred, that the astronomical inflationary levels were themselves
entirely predictable; the di culty was predicting the exact point at which ‘the
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mark was clearly detached from the group of other principal European curren-
cies’. As Bresciani-Turroni (ibid, p. 38). perceptively observed:
“Throughout this period [1914 – second half of 1919] the movement
of the mark exchange was analogous to that of the other principal
European exchanges, save for the greater amplitude of fluctuation.”
The ‘detachment’ of this ‘movement of the mark exchange’, from about the
second half of 1919 is, then, the subject of monetary macroeconomic theorising
and the onset of the kind of hyperinflation that was observed, and its simi-
larity with more modern episodes in Africa and Latin America, was entirely
predictable once the point of detachment was identified (even if not its reasons,
except with hindsight).
No discounted cash flow formula has anything to do with a ‘fair value’, in
any formally definable sense of ‘fairness’ in economics (or finance).
Professor Garc¸a’s entirely correct intuition to assume that the domain of
the earnings (e) and discount (u) is N is not part of the usual repertoire of
assumptions of the economic or financial modeller – despite facing only mem-
bers of N (or, at best, Q) represented on ‘stock market charts’. This was an
observation made by Maury Osborne at the dawn of mathematical modelling
of financial market data, but the profession has chosen to ignore this impor-
tant fact and return to what may be called the ‘Bachelier tradition’ ([11]), of
exploring and exploiting, indeed flogging to pointless death, the nexus between
non-algorithmic randomness and unpredictability.
3 Whither Computable Economics?
Professor Garc¸a has raised fundamental doubts on the absolutely important
methodological relevance of tying, almost indissolubly, a Gordian knot between
unpredictability and non-algorithmic randomness. One of the cardinal method-
ological precepts of Computable Economics has been to cut this – and many
other orthodox – Gordian knot(s), in particular, as in Professor Garc¸a’s in-
sightful attempt at exploiting the nexus between noncomputability and unpre-
dictability, by formalisms of fundamental economic and financial entities and
units in terms of recursion theory, computable analysis and constructive math-
ematics.
Our basic insight leads us to believe that Herbert Simon’s original research
program, which we now refer to as Classical Behavioural Economics, when sup-
plemented by the methods of computable analysis and constructive mathemat-
ics provides a fuller justification of economic and financial decision making –
and their outcomes as institutional evolution and market data – as decision
problems in the strict sense in which this is defined in metamathematics and
combinatorial mathematics. Essentially, the methodological and epistemological
implications of such a stance in the mathematical modelling of economics and
finance theories is that there will be, as Arrow (op.cit) perceptively observed
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more than a quarter of a century ago, an ‘inherently unpredictable element in
rational behaviour ’.
It must be emphasised that none of this has anything to do with ‘But-
terfly e↵ects’ and other fashionable pseudo-unpredictabilities due to sensitive
dependence on initial conditions (SDIC), horse shoes, and such deterministic
nonlinear dynamical formalisms - but they have everything to do with the In-
completeness intrinsic to Goodstein’s Algorithm and its related results invoking
Ramsey Theory. But this is quite another story - of ine↵ective, incomplete and
undecidable policy games in rich economic dynamics ([30]).
In this sense, then, Professor Garc¸a’s contribution should be welcomed by all
computable economists. It is our hope that it will also be welcomed by those who
still choose to work with stone age tools and invoke related Paleolithic episte-
mologies.
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